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I. INTRODUCTION
A major goal of some tax reform proponents is the elimination of
the return filing requirement for many or all Americans. "100 Million
Unnecessary Returns" is the title of an article in which Michael
Graetz proposes replacing the current income tax with a value added
tax (VAT) and a residual income tax imposed only on taxpayers with
incomes over $100,000.1 According to Graetz, "[t]he vast majority of
American families should not have to file tax returns or deal with the
IRS at all."'2 In the The FairTax Book, the 2005 bestseller by Neal
Boortz and John Linder advocating the replacement of the income tax
with a national sales tax, the elimination of individual tax returns is a
major selling point for the proposal: "No complicated decisions, no
tedious bookkeeping, no saved receipts and tax reporting forms. Oh,
and no audits. . . . And April 15? It becomes just another lovely
spring day."'3 Movement in the direction of a return-free system
would not necessarily require rejection of the income tax as the fed-
eral government's primary revenue source. On May 17, 2005, the
President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform heard several
hours of testimony concerning the possibility of a "return-free" in-
come tax system. 4
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1 Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax
System, 112 Yale L.J. 261 (2002).
2 Id. at 281.
3 Neal Boortz & John Linder, The FairTax Book: Saying Goodbye to the Income Tax
and the IRS 50 (2005).
4 President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Transcript of Ninth Meeting 103-
39 (May 17, 2005) (testimony of Eric Toder, Joseph Bankman, and Grover Norquist), avail-
able at http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/meetings/docs/transcript-05172005.doc [hereinafter
Panel Transcript].
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The Panel learned that there are two kinds of "return-free" income
tax systems.5 Under one system, known as exact (or final) withhold-
ing-of which perhaps the best known example is the PAYE (Pay as
You Earn) system of the United Kingdom-the amount withheld
from wages during the year is designed to equal the precise amount of
the taxpayer's liability, so there is no need for a tax return (or for any
refund or payment of additional tax owed). Such a system could ac-
commodate a limited amount of marginal rate progressivity, and a
limited number of tax-favored expenditures (such as for home mort-
gage interest and charitable contributions), but it could not accommo-
date the level of complexity of the current federal income tax.6
Moreover, some taxpayers-especially those with self-employment in-
come or capital gains-generally are ineligible for exact withholding
and must file returns. 7 According to the General Accounting Office,
as of 1996 thirty-four countries had final withholding systems for at
least some taxpayers. 8
The second type of "return-free" income tax is "tax agency reconcil-
iation," under which the tax agency prepares a tentative return for the
taxpayer based on the data it obtains from third parties (such as em-
ployers and payers of interest). 9 ("Return-free" is obviously a ques-
tionable adjective for a tax agency reconciliation system, but the term
5 Id. at 103-04 (testimony of Eric Toder). For a more detailed description of the two
types of systems, see William G. Gale & Janet Holtzblatt, On the Possibility of a No-Re-
turn Tax System, 50 Nat'l Tax J. 475 (1997).
6 Panel Transcript, note 4, at 106-07 (testimony of Eric Toder). Toder's testimony is
based largely on Treasury Dep't, Return-Free Tax Systems: Tax Simplification Is a Prereq-
uisite (2003), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/noreturn.pdf.
Treasury notes that the U.K. system has only three tax rates, with a basic rate (22%) that
applies to about 80% of taxpayers. Id. at 8. Until recently, the system provided a benefit
for home mortgage interest payments through a payment from the government to the
lender: "A taxpayer with a 10 percent mortgage rate would pay 9 percent interest, and the
lender would collect the remaining one percentage point of interest ... from the govern-
ment." Id. The tax benefit for charitable contributions uses a similar approach. Id. A
taxpayer subject to the 22% basic rate, wanting to give $100 to a charity, would give the
charity $78 and the charity would collect the other $22 from the government. Id. For a
detailed discussion of the U.K.'s PAYE system, see William J. Turnier, PAYE as an Alter-
native to an Alternative Tax System, 23 Va. Tax Rev. 205, 224-31 (2003).
7 Treasury Dep't, note 6, at 7.
8 General Accounting Office, Tax Administration: Alternative Filing Systems, GAO/
GGD-97-6, at 4 (1996), available at http://www.gao.govlarchivelgg97006.pdf.
9 Panel Transcript, note 4, at 104 (testimony of Eric Toder), 111-19 (testimony of Joseph
Bankman). For a recent proposal (made under the auspices of the Hamilton Project of the
Brookings Institution) to make tax agency reconciliation available to as many as 40% of
federal income taxpayers, see Austan Goolsbee, The "Simple Return": Reducing
America's Tax Burden Through Return-Free Filing (2006), available at http://www.
brookings.edu/-/media/Fies/rc/papers/2006/07useconomics-goolsbee/200607goolsbee.pdf.
The oxymoron in the title-"Return-Free Filing"-is indicative of the widespread confu-
sion over whether a system based on tax agency reconciliation is properly understood as a
return-free system.
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is commonly used in this way.) This is practical only for taxpayers
who claim the standard deduction, and all of whose income comes
from sources subject to information reporting.' 0 The taxpayer reviews
the tentative return, and either can file it as drafted by the tax agency,
or can revise it as the taxpayer deems fit. Systems of this sort are in
use in Denmark and Sweden,1 and a recent pilot program
("ReadyReturn") for the California state income tax received very
favorable reviews from the taxpayers who took advantage of it.12
Congress twice has ordered reports on return-free systems. The Tax
Reform Act of 1986 required the IRS to study the feasibility of return-
free income taxation for at least some taxpayers. 13 In the resulting
report, the Service considered the possibility of a tax agency reconcili-
ation system, but concluded it was not feasible with existing technol-
ogy. 14 Congress repeated the legislative demand for a study along
with instructions that such a system actually be implemented by
2007.15 Although Treasury dutifully produced the required report in
2003,16 no program-not even a pilot program-has yet emerged.
Given the Tax Reform Panel's decision to hear testimony on exact
withholding and agency reconciliation systems, the considerable expe-
rience with such systems in other countries, the positive reports on the
California experiment, and the repeated congressional interest in the
idea, one might have expected the Panel's report to have recom-
mended some sort of return-free income tax system for some taxpay-
ers. At the very least, one might have expected the Report to have
raised the issue, and to have discussed the pros and cons. Instead, a
10 General Accounting Office, note 8, at 2 (estimating that 45% of taxpayers filing for
tax year 1992 claimed the standard deduction and had income only from wages, dividends,
pensions, and unemployment compensation, and thus would be eligible for tax agency
reconciliation).
11 Treasury Dep't, note 6, at 49-52.
12 Panel Transcript, note 4, at 112-15 (testimony of Joseph Bankman); Joseph Bankman,
Simple Filing for Average Citizens: The California ReadyReturn, 107 Tax Notes 1431
(June 13, 2005). Intuit (the maker of TurboTax) strongly opposed a bill to provide explicit
statutory authorization for ReadyReturn, and to make the program permanent, and the
bill died without a vote in the 2006 session of the California legislature. Jim Sanders, Tax-
Return Bill Dies in Assembly, Sacramento Bee, June 2, 2006, at A4.
13 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1582, 100 Stat. 2085, 2766 (1986).
14 IRS, Current Feasibility of a Return-Free Tax System (1987), cited in Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Treasury and General Government of the S. Comm. on Appropriations,
106th Cong. 6 (2000) (statement of Leonard E. Burman, Dep. Asst. Sec'y for Tax Analysis,
Treas. Dep't), available at http://ustreas.gov/press/releases/ls548.htm.
15 The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-206, § 2004, 112 Stat. 685, 726 (1998).
16 Treasury Dep't, note 6.
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return-free income tax is the Report's dog that did not bark. It is
simply not discussed in the Report. 17
This Article argues that the Panel was right to retain a return-based
tax system, given the Panel's recommendations for major tax simplifi-
cation. As long as the return filing obligation is not unduly burden-
some-which it would not be under the Panel's simplification
proposals-a filing obligation has significant civic virtues. Part II de-
scribes those virtues. A return-based system represents an appropri-
ate compromise on the level of visibility and painfulness of taxation,
and the filing of a tax return can serve an important ceremonial func-
tion as an expression of fiscal citizenship. Part III suggests that the
civic potential of return filing is not now realized because of the tre-
mendous complexity of the income tax, but that the potential could be
realized under a simplified system. It also suggests that tax agency
reconciliation (such as California's ReadyReturn) should not be un-
derstood as a return-free system, and that a well-designed tax agency
reconciliation system would promote the civic virtues associated with
the filing requirement. Part IV considers the question whether the
civic benefits of tax return filing-in particular the conferring of the
status of taxpayer on the filer, in his own mind and in the minds of
others-are realized when a person files a return but has no income
tax liability (for example, because of the earned income tax credit).
Part V briefly concludes.
II. THE CIVIC VIRTUES OF A RETURN FILING REQUIREMENT
With no discussion of return-free income tax systems in the Tax Re-
form Panel Report, one can only guess why the Panel decided not to
pursue that approach. The Report proposes significant simplification
reforms,"' and the Panel members may have concluded that the reduc-
tion in tax return preparation burdens flowing from simplification
would be relief enough. It is even possible that the Panel members
believed that the tax filing process under a simplified income tax
would not be merely a tolerable evil, but actually would serve impor-
tant civic purposes.
17 See President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair and Pro-Growth:
Proposals to Fix America's Tax System (2005), available at http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/
final-report/. The Report does discuss the costs-in both time and money-imposed on
taxpayers by the return filing requirement. Id. at 35-36. The Report, however, does not
discuss the possibility of eliminating those costs by abandoning the filing requirement.
18 Id. at 59-106.
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A. Withholding, Return Filing, and the Appropriate Level of
Taxpayer Tax Consciousness
If the members were of this view, they may have taken their cues
from Grover Norquist, the President of Americans for Tax Reform,
who testified before the Panel in opposition to return-free systems:
[T]he present system... is at least citizen-based and focuses
taxpayers on what they're paying.... [M]oving to a so-called
return-free system will reduce people's understanding of
what exactly they're paying and their [reduced] focus on it
will make it easier to raise taxes .... We want people to be
aware of what they're paying and how much it costs. The
idea that one of the benefits [of a return-free system] is to
reduce the psychic costs of tax filing reminds me of the argu-
ment for the guillotine, which was that it was more humane.
.. This seems to me the next step after Milton Friedman's
mistake of allowing us to go to withholding during World
War II; the next step in making it easier for the government
to get their hands on your income and making you detached
from the actual cost of government."' 19
Some small-government conservatives argue that taxes should be as
visible and as painful as possible, on the theory that the public will
resist high levels of visible and painful taxes. For these people, the
ideal income tax system would retain filing obligations (to ensure visi-
bility) and would repeal withholding (to maximize the pain of pay-
ment). Richard Armey, for example, once co-sponsored a bill to
replace withholding with the requirement that individuals make
monthly payments of estimated tax.20 During one of the Panel's
meetings (not the one concerned with return-free systems) Milton
Friedman told the Panel that he rued his participation in the develop-
ment of income tax withholding during World War II:
[Withholding] has been a mistake in the post-war period, and
we would have been better off in the post-war period if we
did not have [it]. The reason for that is the withholding tax
makes it easy to collect taxes. It's taken from your check
before you know that you've got it. And so you could not
19 Panel Transcript, note 4, at 119-21 (testimony of Grover Norquist).
20 Stearns Bill Would Repeal Wage Withholding Rules, 71 Tax Notes 915 (Apr. 25, 1996)
(citing House Majority Leader Richard K. Armey as co-sponsor of the bill).
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today have a government of the size it is . . . if you did not
have the withholding tax as a way of raising the money.21
At the other extreme, a big-government proponent might favor
making taxes as nearly invisible and as nearly painless as possible. It
is difficult to find statements from legislators praising the revenue-
raising capacity of hidden taxes-for the same reason magicians are
reluctant to explain their tricks-but the point is widely recognized.
As Jean Baptiste Colbert is said to have remarked, "The art of taxa-
tion consists in so plucking the goose as to obtain the largest possible
amount of feathers with the least possible amount of hissing. '22 From
this point of view, an attractive tax would either dispense with direct
taxation of individuals (as with a VAT or sales tax), or would feature
exact withholding and no tax returns. Without an obligation to pay
over taxes, or to calculate one's tax liability on a return, a taxpayer
would be only minimally aware of the fact that he was paying tax, and
thus only minimally resistant to higher taxes.23
If the elimination of withholding would cripple the revenue-raising
potential of an income tax, and if the elimination of tax returns under
exact withholding would dangerously increase the tax system's reve-
nue-raising capacity, the current system of inexact withholding and re-
turn-based reconciliation may be an attractive middle ground. The
return preparation system forces taxpayers to pay attention to the to-
21 President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Transcript of Sixth Meeting 113-
14 (Mar. 31, 2005) (testimony of Milton Friedman), available at http://www.
taxreformpanel.gov/meetings/docs/transcript_03312005.doc.
22 Statement attributed to Jean Baptiste Colbert, quoted in Jeffery L. Yablon, Certain as
Death-Quotations About Taxes, 110 Tax Notes 103, 123 (Jan. 9, 2006); see also Edward J.
McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1861, 1874-86 (1994) (explaining
in terms of cognitive theory and loss aversion the lesser resistance of the electorate to
hidden taxes-and thus the increasing reliance of Congress on payroll taxes).
23 One indication, from popular culture, of the significance of a return filing obligation
to the visibility of a tax comes from an examination of tax-themed situation comedies.
Although I have identified 89 income-tax related sitcom episodes from 1940 to 2006, I have
not found any sitcom episodes featuring the payroll tax. Lawrence Zelenak, Six Decades
of the Federal Income Tax in Sitcoms, 117 Tax Notes 1265 (Dec. 24, 2007). This disparity is
plausibly explained by the differing visibility levels of the two tax systems, since the sys-
tems do not differ greatly in the amount of revenue they raise, and since most income
taxpayers actually have payroll tax burdens in excess of their income tax burdens. See
Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year
2007, Historical Table 2.2 (2006) (indicating the percentage of total federal receipts gener-
ated by the individual income tax and by payroll taxes in each year from 1934 to 2005; in
2005, for example, the individual income tax produced 43% of federal revenue, while pay-
roll taxes produced 36.9%); Congressional Budget Office, Effective Federal Tax Rates,
1997 to 2000, at 72-73 tbl.C-1 (2003) (indicating that payroll taxes-counting both the em-
ployee and the employer share-exceeded income taxes for most households in all years
from 1979 to 2000, except 1980).
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tal amount of their income tax liability,24 thus constraining the ability
of Congress to impose tax increases; yet the reduced resistance to tax-
ation attributable to withholding enables Congress to raise substantial
revenue through the income tax. Perhaps the Panel appreciated this
delicate balance, and did not want to upset it by proposing a return-
free system. Of course, the immediate concern of most taxpayers at
the time of return preparation is more with the amount of their over-
payment or underpayment, than with the total amount of their tax
liability. From the standpoint of the taxpayer-consciousness-raising
function of the return preparation process, it would be better if tax-
payers paid more attention to their total income tax liabilities, and less
attention to the amounts of their refunds or underpayments. A simple
symbolic step in the right direction would be to make the total tax
liability line on the Form 1040 bigger and bolder than the surrounding
lines.
B. Tax Return Filing as a Purchase-of-Civilization Ceremony
Beyond the contribution of income tax returns to restraining Levia-
than, the tax return preparation process does-or at least could-
serve the important civic purpose of recognizing and formalizing the
fulfillment of the financial responsibilities of citizenship.2 5 As Justice
Holmes famously remarked, "I like to pay taxes. With them I buy
24 Requiring taxpayers to file tax returns is not the only possible way to call taxpayers'
attention to the total amount of their income tax liability. Marjorie Kornhauser recently
proposed requiring the Service to send each income taxpayer an "annual tax statement,"
loosely modeled on "Your Social Security Statement," which the Social Security Adminis-
tration sends annually to wage earners. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty:
Will Publicizing Tax Information Increase Compliance?, 18 Can. J.L. & Juris. 95, 106-09
(2005). The statement might include, among other things, "the highlights of a taxpayer's
last two income tax returns" (including gross income, tax liability, and marginal and effec-
tive tax rates), and "statistical comparisons between the individual taxpayer's own tax situ-
ation and the average and median of other taxpayers, broken out into income brackets."
Id. at 108. The individualized statement would be accompanied by a "Know Your Taxes"
booklet, which would explain the basic operation of the income tax system. Id. at 109-10.
The proposal has considerable merit, but Kornhauser intends it only as a supplement to the
return filing requirement, not as a replacement, and rightly so. It is inconceivable that the
mailing of annual statements could produce anything close to the level of tax consciousness
produced by annual tax return filing.
25 The United States is unique, among the major economic powers of the world, in im-
posing income tax on the basis of citizenship alone-that is, imposing income tax on the
worldwide income of U.S. citizens not resident in the United States. Hugh J. Ault & Brian
J. Arnold, Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis 347 (2d ed. 2004). The
Supreme Court acknowledged the power of Congress to tax solely on the basis of citizen-
ship in Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924). The Court remarked that "the government, by
its very nature, benefits the citizen and his property wherever found," and that the power
to tax a citizen is based "upon his relation as citizen to the United States and the relation of
the latter to him as citizen." Id. at 56. In a formal sense, then, the connection between
income taxation and citizenship is uniquely strong in the United States. There is reason to
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civilization. '26 Such an important civic activity demands a ceremony,
and the filing of one's tax return is that ceremony.2 7 The filing cere-
mony may prompt taxpayers to ponder how much civilization they
want to buy and whether they are getting good civilization value for
their tax dollars,28 but the linkage between citizen and government
through the tax return process has the potential to go deeper than
that. April 15 can and should be as important a civic holiday as the
first Tuesday after the first Monday in November.2 9 Together, the two
days celebrate the fulfillment of the two great responsibilities of citi-
zenship. Former IRS Commissioner Mark Everson made the connec-
tion between tax filing and voting in his remarks to the Tax Reform
Panel:
[L]ast year 183 million people filed individual income tax re-
turns. To put that number in perspective, it is fully half again
the number of people who voted in the presidential election.
In that sense, paying taxes is a unifying experience funda-
mental to our democracy and respect for the rule of law. 30
doubt, however, that the lessons of Cook v. Tait have seeped deeply into the popular
consciousness.
26 Randolph E. Paul, Taxation for Prosperity 277 (1947) (quoting Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr.); see also Compania Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Rev-
enue, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Taxes are what we pay for civilized
society ... ").
27 Tax day is an occasion for media ruminations on tax policy; there would be fewer and
less thoughtful discussions of tax policy in the media without the trigger of April 15. Note,
as two examples among hundreds of tax-related articles and op-eds published on or around
April 15, Joseph J. Thorndike, Hurts So Good, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 2005, at A19; Austan
Goolsbee, Why Tell the I.R.S. What It Already Knows?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 2006, at A25.
28 As Andrew Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury during the 1920's, remarked: "Nothing
brings home to a man the feeling that he personally has an interest in seeing that govern-
ment revenues are not squandered, but intelligently expended, as the fact that he contrib-
utes individually a direct tax, no matter how small, to his government." Thorndike, note
27, at A19 (quoting Mellon).
29 If a return-free income tax system threatens the ritual value of paying taxes, a
mandatory vote-by-mail system (as pioneered by Oregon) may pose a similar threat to the
ritual value of voting. See Timothy Egan, Living Rooms Replace Polling Booths in Ore-
gon's Mail-In Senate Election, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1995, at A19 (describing the first all
vote-by-mail Oregon election, and noting the criticism that vote-by-mail "deprives voters
of one of their most important rituals: the Election Day walk to the polls"). The parallel is
not exact, of course. Except for those few taxpayers who take their returns to the post
office shortly before midnight on April 15, tax return filing has never involved a public
ceremony comparable to gathering at the polling place. In fact, the objection to voting by
mail is that it reduces the voting ceremony to a level comparable to the taxpaying cere-
mony. Id.
30 Testimony of Mark W. Everson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Before the Pres-
ident's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform 2 (Mar. 3, 2005), available at http://www.
taxreformpanel.gov/meetings/pdf/everson 03032005.pdf; see also William J. Kambas, Re-
form and Modernization of the Tax Compliance Process, 108 Tax Notes 1447, 1450-51
(Sept. 19, 2005) ("[Tjhe tax compliance process is integral to the U.S. system of par-
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This view of tax return filing as a valuable civic ceremony should be
attractive to those who subscribe to a fairly wide range of republican
or liberal political theories. As described by Cass Sunstein, republican
and liberal political theories, despite their considerable variety, share
an emphasis on "forming public policy through deliberation, on politi-
cal equality, [and] on citizenship .... "31 The commitment to delibera-
tion favors "political institutions that promote discussion and debate
among the citizenry .... ",32 By focusing public attention on the in-
come tax system every April, the filing requirement furthers the delib-
erative goal. The filing requirement also promotes the goal of
political equality (under which "all individuals ... have access to the
political process" and "large disparities in political influence are disfa-
vored" 33), by recognizing and formalizing the status of each tax return
filer as a taxpayer-whether her tax liability happens to be $1 or $1
million.34 It is true that a return-free but individually-based tax sys-
tem, such as the U.K.'s PAYE, can confer some sense of widespread
taxpayer status, thus promoting political equality, but it cannot do so
with the forcefulness of a return-based system. Placing a "high pre-
mium on citizenship and participation,' 35 republican and liberal politi-
cal theorists "attempt to provide outlets for the exercise of
citizenship. ' 36 The return filing ceremony serves admirably as the pri-
mary outlet for the exercise of financial citizenship.37
In 2007 the notion of tax-filing-as-civic-ceremony may seem like a
hopelessly naive view of April 15, but there is considerable anecdotal
evidence that tax filing day really served this purpose in previous de-
cades. When the income tax became a mass tax during World War
11,38 Irving Berlin responded by writing the song, "I Paid My Income
Tax Today":
ticipatory governance .... ); Richard A. Musgrave, Clarifying Tax Reform, 70 Tax Notes
731, 732 (Feb. 5, 1996) ("Moving to a wholly depersonalized [tax] system would reduce
taxpayer awareness of the fiscal process and thereby dilute responsible fiscal citizenship.").
31 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L.J. 1539, 1567 (1988).
32 Id. at 1549.
33 Id. at 1552.
34 But see Part IV (questioning whether taxpayer status is conferred by a filing require-
ment in the absence of any positive income tax liability).
35 Sunstein, note 31, at 1555.
36 Id. at 1556.
37 Admittedly, the described civic benefits of tax return filing will not appeal to those
who subscribe to interest group pluralism-under which politics is simply a struggle among
groups for a limited supply of societal resources-as a normative political theory. Al-
though the claims in this Section are not addressed to pluralists, even they should appreci-
ate the role a filing requirement might play in focusing individuals' attention on their
interests as taxpayers, thus making them better able to pursue their self-interest through
the political process.
38 See generally Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in
the Expansion of the Income Tax During World War II, 37 Buff. L. Rev. 685 (1989).
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I said to my Uncle Sam
"Old Man Taxes here I am"
And he-was glad to see me.
Lower brackets that's my speed
Mister Small Fry yes indeed
But gee-I'm proud as can be.
I paid my income tax today
I'm only one of millions more
Whose income never was taxed before
A tax I'm very glad to pay
I'm squared up with the U.S.A.
You see those bombers in the sky
Rockefeller helped to build them
so did I
I paid my income tax today.39
Nor did this attitude disappear with the end of the war. Michael
Graetz has described a scene that may sound familiar to many baby
boomers:
I remember decades ago my father taking over our dining
room table, sitting there filling out his tax return off and on
from about mid-February until April 15 every year. This in-
furiated my mother for obvious reasons. My father struggled
on, viewing his duty to determine how much tax he owed the
way Justice Holmes did: as the price we pay for a civilized
society. 40
Or consider The Honeymooners episode, "Income Tax," first broad-
cast on March 7, 1953.41 Ralph Kramden prepares his tax return, with
considerable difficulty. ("I'm dropping dead from the question" on
the return, he remarks at one point.42) He finds that he owes $15,
which he could pay with the $15 he had saved to buy a new bowling
39 Irving Berlin, I Paid My Income Tax Today (1942), quoted in Carolyn C. Jones, Mass-
Based Income Taxation: Creating a Taxpaying Culture, 1940-1952, in Funding the Modern
American State, 1941-1995, at 107, 122 (W. Elliot Brownlee ed., 1996).
40 Michael J. Graetz, A Fair and Balanced Tax System for the Twenty-First Century, in
Toward Fundamental Tax Reform 48, 49 (Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett eds.,
2005).
41 Situation comedies can serve as important source material in constructing a social
history of the income tax. Those episodes are described in Zelenak, note 23. Several of
those episodes, reflecting changing attitudes to income tax preparation, are discussed
below.
42 The Honeymooners: Income Tax (CBS television broadcast Mar. 7, 1953).
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ball.43 Just at that moment, however, a priest drops by and asks for a
donation for the "hungry and homeless abroad," and Ralph gives him
the $15. 4 4 Ralph tells Alice, his wife, that he will get the tax money by
working an extra shift.45 The episode concludes with Ralph declaring:
I didn't mean that before what I said about income taxes.
Boy, we should give everything to the government. We're
living in a great country. This is the greatest country in the
world. We've got parks for the kids. Everybody's free to say
what they think and do and please. It's a great place. You
know something? We're pretty lucky, even though we didn't
have a hurricane, a fire or an explosion.46
Similar attitudes were expressed in a number of other radio and
television situation comedies from the late 1940's through the early
1960's. In a 1948 radio episode of The Adventures of Ozzie and Har-
riet, Emmy Lou, a neighborhood girl, sees Ozzie mailing his tax return
and is moved to exclaim:
Oh, what a wonderful bit of Americana! There you stand by
the mailbox, a patriotic smile on your face. Your heart cries
out, "Take it, Uncle Sam! There's a lot more where that
came from!" No complaining, no grumbling, you're eager
and willing to pay your country its due. You're 130 million
Americans, Mr. Nelson!47
Although the show plays Emmy Lou's over-the-top enthusiasm for a
laugh, the show appears to endorse Emmy Lou's basic attitude toward
the tax filing ceremony. A 1950 episode of Life with Luigi, a radio
situation comedy featuring a recent immigrant, closes with Luigi writ-
ing a letter to his mother in Italy, telling her that the total tax collec-
tions of the United States for the year were more than $46 billion, and
that "I'm proud to tell you that $1.56 is what I paid in."'48 Another
sitcom immigrant, Jose Jimemez of the Bill Dana Show, expressed
similar sentiments in a 1963 episode.49 Jose tells a co-worker, "I get a
wonderful feeling out of making my income tax." °50 Jose treats prepar-
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. The last sentence refers to Ralph's disappointment, expressed earlier in the epi-
sode, that he did not qualify for a casualty loss deduction.
47 The Adventures of Ozzie and Harriet, "Income Tax," (NBC television broadcast Mar.
7, 1949).
48 Life with Luigi, "Income Tax Season" (CBS television broadcast Mar. 7, 1950).
49 The Bill Dana Show, "A Tip for Uncle Sam" (NBC television broadcast Jan. 8, 1963).
50 Id.
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ing his return as an occasion for reflecting on "the privilege of living in
this wonderful country and having my coastline protected." 51
There may be another valuable ceremonial aspect to the tax return
filing obligation-the recognition that the government trusts its citi-
zens to report correctly their income and deductions, and to calculate
their own tax liabilities. This trust-and the concomitant opportunity
to disappoint that trust-may be important in symbolizing that the
powers of the government are indeed (in the words of the Declaration
of Independence) derived "from the consent of the governed." 52 This
would be lost in a return-free system, in which the typical taxpayer
would have no choice but to fully comply with his tax obligations.53
Of course, withholding, information reporting, and audits make it
clear that the government trusts taxpayers only up to a point (and a
not-very-distant point at that), and there is obviously a limit on how
much trust is compatible with efficient tax collection. Still, the level of
trust implicit in the current system is far from trivial (especially with
respect to deductions), and the civic virtues flowing from reciprocal
trust-with the government trusting taxpayers to self-assess and pay
their proper tax liabilities, and taxpayers trusting the government to
spend tax dollars responsibly-may be worth the inevitable noncom-
pliance by some taxpayers.54
The current system also empowers citizens to protest government
actions, by using either a failure to file or a failure to pay as form of
civil disobedience. 55 As Judge McKay of the Tenth Circuit has writ-
51 Id.
52 The Declaration of Independence para.2 (U.S. 1776).
53 If it is not too grandiose to suggest it, a filing obligation gives taxpayers an element of
free will somewhat analogous to the Miltonian conception of Adam and Eve as "Sufficient
to have stood, though free to fall." John Milton, Paradise Lost, Book iii, line 99 (1667).
54 In an article examining the effect of trust on taxpayer compliance, Benno Torgler
suggests that governmental trust in citizens, demonstrated by "allow[ing] citizens to declare
their own income and to make generalised deductions," could cause citizens to reciprocate
the government's trust, thus promoting taxpayer compliance (because levels of compliance
are positively correlated with levels of trust in government). Benno Torgler, Tax Morale,
Rule-Governed Behaviour and Trust, 14 Const. Pol. Econ. 119, 137 (2003). If government
trust in taxpayers is valued only instrumentally-for its potential to improve tax compli-
ance-Torgler's suggestion seems to miss an important point. True, taxpayers will not ex-
ploit every opportunity to cheat under a return-based system in which they feel trusted, but
there may be less cheating under a return-free system simply because the system provides
for fewer opportunities for cheating. The suggestion in the text is not that reciprocal trust
has instrumental value in promoting compliance, but that such trust is intrinsically valuable
in a democracy.
55 See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of
Tax Protests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 Buff. L. Rev. 819 (2002) [hereinafter
Legitimacy] (a wide-ranging critical review of the history of tax protests in the United
States, examining both their positive and negative aspects); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, For
God and Country: Taxing Conscience, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 939 (reviewing the history of U.S.
anti-war tax protests, and proposing a statute to allow war tax resisters to direct their tax
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ten, "It is hard to imagine a kind of political protest more consistent
with the most cherished traditions of this nation than protest focusing
on the laws of taxation. ' 56 Tax-related civil disobedience does not re-
quire a return-based income tax-after all, Thoreau's famous act of
civil disobedience was a refusal to pay a poll tax 7-but it does require
a form of taxation imposed directly on individuals and giving individu-
als some choice as to whether or not to comply. A national value-
added tax, national sales tax, or even a truly return-free income tax
(such as the U.K.'s PAYE system) would not provide this opportunity.
Of course, some might favor the elimination of the filing requirement
precisely in order to eliminate the opportunity for tax protesting. As
long as tax protests do not overwhelm the system, however, retaining
a return-based income tax as an avenue for civil disobedience has its
merits. Better, perhaps, to provide a tax outlet for civil disobedience
than to leave citizens either feeling powerless to lodge a meaningful
protest, or considering less peaceful protest methods.5 8
III. VIRTUES LoST AND REGAINED
A. Have the Civic Virtues Been Lost?
Realizing the civic potential of return filing may require a reasona-
bly straightforward and transparent income tax. The tax faced by
Michael Graetz's father and by Ralph Kramden was adequate by
those criteria.59 If, however, taxpayers experience the income tax as a
complex mess-a fair description of the federal income tax today6 0-
then their reflections on the income tax, and on government itself,
may take a far-from-Holmesian turn. The civic virtues are not then
merely lost; they are turned into vices. Rather than solidifying the
payments to a Peace Tax Fund, no portion of which would be spent for military purposes);
Angela P. Harris, Vultures in Eagles' Clothing: Conspiracy and Racial Fantasy in Populist
Legal Thought, 10 Mich. J. Race & Law 269, 277-85 (2005) (describing a number of the tax
protest arguments of the "legal populist movement," including the arguments that wages
are not income, and that the Sixteenth Amendment was never ratified).
56 United States v. Amon, 669 F.2d 1351, 1364 (1981) (McKay, J., dissenting).
57 Henry David Thoreau, The Variorum Civil Disobedience 11-27 (Walter Harding ed.,
Twayne Publishers 1967) (1849).
58 As Kornhauser has observed, "The challenge for this country is to maintain the deli-
cate balance between healthy and self-destructive tax protest." Kornhauser, Legitimacy,
note 55, at 929. The elimination of the return-based income tax might leave too little room
for healthy tax protest.
59 See, e.g., 1 Treas. Dep't, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth 2
(1984) ("Though the 1954 income tax system exhibited some serious problems, it was rela-
tively simple, it was more nearly neutral toward many economic decisions, and most citi-
zens probably thought it was reasonably fair.").
60 See Graetz, note 40, at 50, fig. 1 (chart showing that the federal income tax statutes
and regulations grew from approximately 1.5 millions words in 1946, to approximately 9.4
million words in 2000).
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link between citizen and government, return filing poisons the rela-
tionship. This point has been noted by a number of commentators.
Complaining that "[t]axpayers at every economic level confront ex-
traordinary complexity," Graetz concludes that "[i]n America today,
very few people share my dad's attitude toward taxes."' 61 And former
Commissioner Everson warns that "[t]hose who seek to comply but
cannot understand their tax obligations may ... ultimately throw up
their hands and say 'why bother." 62 After spending many miserable
hours satisfying their filing obligations, taxpayers are not likely to be
basking in the warm glow of Holmesian contemplation of their fiscal
citizenship.63 (An alternative hypothesis-that the deterioration in
attitudes toward the tax return filing process is attributable to trends
in recent decades in the prevalence and dollar amounts of tax refunds
is considered and rejected later in this Article. 64)
A change in attitudes to the income tax produced by increasing
complexity can be traced through the subsequent treatment of the in-
come tax in two working class situation comedies-All in the Family
and Roseanne-both clearly descended from The Honeymooners.
In "Archie's Fraud," a 1972 episode of All in the Family, the IRS
audits Archie Bunker's friend, Munson. 65 In order to prove his busi-
ness expenses, Munson asks Archie for a receipt for the $680 cash
Munson paid Archie last year for driving Munson's taxi on Sundays.66
61 Id. at 49-50.
62 Everson, note 30, at 4; see also Kambas, note 30, at 1450 ("Americans were once
unified, in fact linked, with their governments through the exercise of tax compliance. Re-
cently, however, that relationship is challenged because the compliance process has be-
come a mere burden, rather than remain[ing] a proud responsibility.").
63 Examining survey data from the 1990 Taxpayer Opinion Survey (sponsored by the
IRS), Adam Forest and Steven Sheffrin "found no systematic links between [taxpayers']
perceptions of complexity and [taxpayers'] perceptions of unfairness." Adam Forest &
Steven Sheffrin, Complexity and Compliance: An Empirical Investigation, 55 Nat'l Tax J.
75, 86 (2002). The problem with increasing tax complexity, however, is not that taxpayers
necessarily view a more complex tax as a less fair tax. Rather, as stated in the text, the
problem is that an excruciating encounter with the complexities of the filing obligation is
incompatible with filing as a valuable civic exercise, even if the taxpayer believes the com-
plex system distributes tax burdens fairly.
Of course, as Forest and Sheffrin acknowledge, "[T]here is no necessary theoretical link
between the complexity of the tax system and its perceived unfairness that will hold over
all places and time." Id. at 76. It is possible that the increase in tax complexity from 1990
to the present has resulted in taxpayers perceiving the income tax to be less fair. This is
especially likely if post-1990 increases in complexity have caused most taxpayers to view
the income tax as an impenetrable black box, which spits out a tax bill through some pro-
cess that they cannot begin to understand. In that case, taxpayers can have no assurance
that tax liabilities (both their own and those of their fellow taxpayers) are produced by a
set of fair rules.
64 See Section III.B.
65 All in the Family, "Archie's Fraud" (CBS television broadcast Sept. 23, 1972).
66 Id.
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When Archie refuses, because Archie did not report the income on
his own return, Munson declares, "That's fraud," and Edith, Gloria,
and Mike (Archie's wife, daughter, and son-in-law) stare disapprov-
ingly at Archie. Gloria asks, "How could you cheat on your taxes?"
Archie replies, "I didn't cheat. I just done what everyone else does."
Mike disagrees: "Everybody doesn't cheat. .. . And if Archie com-
mitted a fraud they could fine him or put him in jail." A beleagured
Archie defends himself on the grounds that he was just "exercising my
loophole." Rather than waiting for the Service to discover his mis-
deed, Archie decides to visit the IRS office to file an amended return,
where Edith explains to the IRS employee, "Archie volunteered to
come down as soon as he found he might have to go to prison." When
the IRS employee tells Archie that he owes $140 tax, Archie tries to
bribe him with offers of free cab rides and free tires. The employee
responds by ordering an audit of Archie's returns for the last three
years. The scene concludes with Edith consoling Archie, "Oh Archie,
it ain't so bad. At least you found an honest man. 67
Compared with The Honeymooners almost twenty years earlier, All
in the Family suggests that the taxpayer-government linkage through
the tax return system had eroded over the intervening years, but still
retained considerable strength. Unlike Ralph, Archie responds to the
encounter with his tax return by cheating, not by singing hymns of
praise to America. On the other hand, Archie's cheating is con-
demned by all the members of his family, including Edith-who, naive
though she may be, is clearly the show's moral compass. And the epi-
sode ends with Archie being justly punished.68
If All in the Family suggests the civic virtues associated with return
filing had eroded by 1972, the "April Fool's Day" episode of Roseanne
suggests those virtues had disappeared by 1990.69 The episode opens
67 Id.
68 Another sitcom episode from the early 1970's-a 1974 episode of Maude-similarly
suggests both that income tax honesty norms had badly eroded, and that tax cheaters were
likely to be punished. Faced with an audit, a nervous Walter (Maude's husband) tells
Maude, "I haven't done anything that every other taxpayer doesn't do." To this Maude
responds, "That bad, huh?" The audit results in a large tax bill for Walter. Maude, "The
Tax Audit" (CBS television broadcast Feb. 12, 1974).
69 Roseanne, "April Fool's Day" (ABC television broadcast Apr. 10, 1990). Attributing
the corrosive cynicism of "April Fool's Day" to the increasing complexity of the Code fits
uncomfortably with the fact that the tax return in the episode is for 1989-a year in which
most of the simplification gains from the Tax Reform Act of 1986 had not yet been lost.
On the other hand, the income tax of the late 1970's and early-to-mid 1980's was indeed a
complex mess, and the negative attitudes generated by a decade or more of complex messi-
ness did not suddenly disappear as a result of the 1986 legislation. Moreover, polling data
suggest that taxpayers had grown so cynical by 1990 that they refused to recognize the
simplification gains from the 1986 Act. In a Gallup Survey conducted in March 1990, 31%
of respondents thought that the 1986 Act had made paying their taxes more complicated,
48% thought the complexity had remained about the same, and only 12% thought the 1986
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with Dan Conner sitting at his kitchen table on April 15, working on
his tax return. His encounter with the form and instructions leads to
his angry description of the income tax as "[a] stupid system run by
stupid people, thought up by stupid people, hired by stupid people."
("Who were elected by even stupider people," Roseanne helpfully
points out.) He complains, "This stuff's so complicated nobody can
understand it." Roseanne offers to help, but after a short review of
the instructions she says, "OK, I give up. What language is this?"
One of their children asks whether they cheat on their income tax.
Roseanne says, "Absolutely not," at the same time winking and nod-
ding to indicate they do cheat. 70
Uncertain whether they should have a Form 1099 for $400 of in-
come Roseanne earned by selling magazine subscriptions, and unable
to find the answer in the instructions, they decide to go to the local
IRS office. After a long wait, an obnoxious IRS employee points out
the answer (that a 1099 is not required for amounts of less than $600)
in the instructions and remarks: "The answer is there in writing.
Sorry there are no pictures." This inspires Roseanne to exclaim: "No
human being can really understand these things, you know that.
That's why you've got to go get some $200 an hour lawyer to explain
the crap to you, you know. And I can't afford $200 an hour." An-
other IRS employee chimes in: "We don't write the stinking laws.
You got a complaint, talk to the idiots in Congress." Roseanne ad-
dresses her next remarks to the entire room: "The poor people and us
regular people, we're paying more taxes than the rich people, 'cause
they've got all the lawyers to figure out all the loopholes. '71
They then go home to complete their return. Although the episode
is not explicit on this point, the implication is that once they know the
$400 was not subject to third-party reporting, they do not include it on
their return. The show ends with an ironic coda, featuring John Good-
man (the actor playing Dan Conner) out of character (or at least play-
ing himself), and apparently concerned that the IRS may decide to
audit him in retaliation for the opinions expressed by Dan Conner in
the episode: "What you've just seen was a play. . . . I personally
have nothing but the utmost respect for the Internal Revenue Service
and all its dedicated workers. Because, you know, it's the great guys
and gals at the IRS that keep America rolling .... So I beg you
Act had simplified the process. Gallup Survey of March 8-March 11, 1990 (March Wave
1), question 15, available at http:/Ibrain.gallup.com/documents/trendQuestion.aspx?QuEs-
TrON=36404&Advanced=0.
70 Id.
71 Id.
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please do not confuse hardworking, responsible taxpaying John Good-
man with that loveable but naughty scamp Dan Conner.
72
There is a limit to the tax policy lessons that can reasonably be
drawn from sitcom episodes,73 but other evidence also suggests a com-
plexity-related erosion in the civic virtues of the return filing process.
The most striking evidence that taxpayers perceive the income tax to
have grown more complex over the past few decades has been the
near disappearance of the taxpayer preparing his own return with
pencil and paper.74 In the 1950's fewer than 20% of taxpayers used
72 Id. Other sitcom episodes from the early 1990's also suggest the disappearance of the
civic virtues formerly associated with return filing. In an episode of Married... with Chil-
dren, Al Bundy panics when he receives an audit notice because he had claimed twenty-
three dependents on the to-be-audited return. Married... with Children, "A Taxing Prob-
lem" (Fox television broadcast Jan. 14, 1990). It is true that Al Bundy is a generally repre-
hensible character, but the attitude toward the income tax exhibited by the generally
admirable Cliff Huxtable is only a slight improvement over Bundy's. In a 1992 episode of
The Cosby Show, Cliff wants Claire to prepare their return with the help of The Patriot's
Guide to Taxpaying, the author of which was "drummed out [of the IRS] for giving too
many tax tips to the American taxpayer." The Cosby Show, "Some Gifts Aren't Deducti-
ble" (NBC television broadcast Apr. 23, 1992). Cliff tries to convince Claire that they
qualify for (among other things) an exemption for government workers disabled by terror-
ist attacks and a deduction for owners of trees destroyed by southern pine beetles. Id.
73 Given the large number of tax-related sitcom episodes-almost 90 from 1940 to the
present-it is not surprising that a few episodes go against the general trend. A dishonest
character may cheat on his income tax even in an era in which the income tax is held in
high regard, and an honest character may comply with his tax obligations even in a dishon-
est era. For example, despite the respect for the tax system demonstrated by most 1950's
sitcoms, Sergeant Bilko spends most of a 1956 episode generating fraudulent receipts to
support claimed tax deductions. The Phil Silvers Show, "Bilko's Tax Trouble" (CBS televi-
sion broadcast Dec. 4, 1956). And despite the disrespect for the tax system reflected in
most recent sitcoms, in a 2006 episode of My Name is Earl, paying his income tax (belat-
edly) causes Earl to reflect, in a voiceover: "[EJven if you don't see the government work-
ing for you every day, it's out there working for somebody." My Name Is Earl, "Didn't
Pay Taxes" (NBC television broadcast Mar. 2, 2006).
74 There is an impressively large body of public opinion data on various income tax-
related issues, going back to the 1940's. For an excellent collection of much of the availa-
ble data, see Karlyn Bowman, AEI Studies in Public Opinion: Public Opinion on Taxes
(updated Apr. 6, 2007), available at http://www.aei.org/publicopinion6. One might try to
discern changing views on the complexity of the income tax by consulting these survey
data. Unfortunately, pollsters have not been asking questions focused on complexity for
long enough for any clear trends to have emerged in the polling results. See id. at 69
(reporting results of surveys taken in 2003, 2005, and 2006, asking respondents whether the
income tax was "very complex," "somewhat complex," "not too complex," or "not at all
complex;" in the 2003 survey 86% thought the income tax was either very or somewhat
complex, compared with 81% in 2005 and 80% in 2006). There are older polls asking
taxpayers how difficult they found it to prepare their returns, but the respondents were
limited to those who prepared their own returns. See, e.g., The Roper Organization Inc.,
The American Public and the Income Tax System: The Third in a Series of Studies, Ques-
tion 35 (May 1979), available at http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu as USRSPHR-
BLOCK1979-0673 (in a survey commissioned by H&R Block, 5% of respondents found
"this year's federal tax forms" very difficult to fill out, 15% found the forms fairly difficult,
37% found the forms not very difficult, and 43% found the forms not difficult at all);
Chilton Research Services, National Poll, Question 34 (Apr. 1987), available at http://
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paid preparers. 75 By 1993 paid preparers were responsible for 51% of
all individual returns, while 8% of taxpayers did their own returns
with the help of recently-introduced tax return preparation software,
and 41% continued to do their own returns the old-fashioned way.76
Ten years after that, in 2003, the market share of paid preparers had
grown to 62%, taxpayers using software had increased to 25%, and
the pencil-and-paper crowd had dwindled to 13%. 77 Although the
growth in taxpayers' use of software might be explained entirely by
technological innovation rather than by increasing tax law complexity,
the impressive long-term growth in the use of paid preparers (even in
the face of competition from do-it-yourself software, and despite in-
creases in the inflation-adjusted cost of return preparation services) 78
almost certainly represents a response to increasing complexity. 79
The growing reliance by taxpayers on paid preparers raises two
questions relating to the possible civic virtues of a return filing re-
quirement. The first is whether a taxpayer who uses a paid preparer
retains enough involvement in the process to generate the civic vir-
tues. The second is whether the threat posed to the civic virtues by
complexity can be negated by the use of paid preparers. In other
words, when taxpayers hire paid preparers to deal with complexity, do
they avoid the negative feelings toward the tax system that would re-
sult if they had to grapple with the complexity themselves?
roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu as USABCWASH1987-7021 (responding to a question in
a 1987 survey sponsored by ABC News and The Washington Post, 31% found figuring out
federal taxes and filling out the forms very difficult, 26% somewhat difficult, 21% not too
difficult, and 18% not difficult at all).
75 Michael J. Graetz, The Decline (and Fall?) of the Income Tax 81 (1997).
76 Eric Toder, Changes in Tax Preparation Methods, 1993-2003, 107 Tax Notes 759 (May
9, 2005).
77 Id.
78 Data on the average return preparation fees charged by H&R Block are available in
H&R Block's annual returns. In 1992, for example, the average fee (for U.S. clients) was
$53.31. Author's calculations, based on H&R Block, 1996 Annual Report 33 (data for 1992
total U.S. tax preparation fees and total U.S. returns prepared). By 2006, the average fee
had grown to $165.06. H&R Block, 2007 Form 10K, at 26, available at http://www.hr-
block.com/presscenter. If the average fee had merely kept pace with inflation from 1992 to
2007, the average fee in 2007 would have been only about $79 (according to author's calcu-
lations using the inflation calculator of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/
cpi).
79 Even without increasing complexity, the use of paid preparers might grow if the value
of taxpayers' time increased more rapidly than the cost of return preparation services.
Although that might explain some of the increase in the use of paid preparers by higher-
income taxpayers, it would not explain why, in 2002, 67% of low-income parents who filed
tax returns received help preparing their returns (with almost all the help coming from
paid preparers). Elaine Maag, Paying the Price? Low-Income Parents and the Use of Paid
Tax Preparers, New Federalism: National Survey of America's Families, Series B, No. B-
64, at 3 (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/411145 B-64.pdf.
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My tentative answer to the first question is, yes, the civic virtues of
return filing are compatible with the use of paid preparers. The vir-
tues are the result of the taxpayer's active engagement in the process,
and active engagement is possible without taxpayers spending hours
deciphering the forms and instructions themselves. In fact, IRS re-
search for tax year 2000 indicates that taxpayers who used paid
preparers spent an average of 27.5 hours on return preparation activi-
ties (such as recordkeeping, tax planning, gathering tax materials, and
consulting with paid preparers).,s The average cost for the services of
a paid preparer was $243.81 The 27.5 hours average for users of paid
preparers was actually more than the average of 18.1 hours spent by
taxpayers who prepared their own returns using pencil and paper. 82 If
the typical user of a paid preparer spends the equivalent of more than
three working days on the return preparation process (broadly de-
fined to include recordkeeping and tax planning, which may have
been done many months before the actual preparation of the return),
that should be more than enough time to produce the desired degree
of contemplation of one's tax liability and of the tax system in general.
That leads to the second question-does the increasing taxpayer re-
liance on paid preparers make it possible for Congress to increase the
complexity of the tax laws without losing the civic virtues of return
filing? Any answer is necessarily speculative, but I believe it does not.
The 27.5 hours figure suggests that much of the burden of dealing with
complexity cannot be transferred to paid preparers.8 3 The problem
with the figure is not that it is so small as to eliminate meaningful
taxpayer participation in the process, but that it is so large as to gener-
ate taxpayer hostility to the process and to the income tax itself. And
even to the extent taxpayers are able to avoid the time cost of com-
plexity by hiring paid preparers, they will recognize the cost of the
paid preparers-an average of $223-as itself a cost of complexity,
and resent it as such. Moreover, the use of preparers does nothing to
alleviate taxpayers' sense of the income tax system as a black box,
80 John L. Guyton, Adam K. Korobow, Peter S. Lee & Eric J. Toder, The Effects of Tax
Software and Paid Preparers on Compliance Costs, 58 Nat'l Tax J. 439, 441 tbl.1 (2005).
81 Id.; see also H&R Block, note 78, at 25 (indicating H&R Block charged an average of
$160.68 per return for return preparation services in its fiscal year 2006).
82 Guyton et al., note 80, at 441 tbl.1. Taxpayers using software to prepare their own
returns spent the most time of all groups-37.3 hours on average. Id. Although perhaps
surprising, the results are not anomalous because the returns prepared by taxpayers with
pencil and paper tend to be considerably simpler than the returns for either of the other
two groups. Taxpayers using software saved themselves 7.5 hours on average compared
with the pencil-and-paper option (at an average cost of $11 for the software), and taxpay-
ers using paid preparers saved themselves 23.4 hours on average compared with the pencil-
and-paper option (at an average cost of $223). Id. at 444 tbl.2.
83 For a discussion of why it is difficult or impossible to transfer much of the burden of
dealing with complexity to paid preparers, see text accompanying notes 99-101.
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producing income tax liabilities through the use of incomprehensible
rules that taxpayers have no reason to assume are fair.
B. Do Tax Refund Trends Explain Changing Attitudes?
As detailed below, since the 1970's roughly three-quarters of indi-
vidual income tax returns have shown overpayments, indicating the
taxpayers are entitled to refunds (of tax withheld, estimated tax pay-
ments, or of refundable credits).8 4 Taxpayers' attitudes toward the re-
turn filing process may be affected by whether they associate the
process with receiving a refund of an overpayment, or with having to
write a check in the amount of an underpayment. If there had been a
decline over the past half-century in the prevalence of refunds, that
might explain the decline in good feelings about the return filing pro-
cess (and thus serve as an alternative to the complexity-based story
offered above). In fact, however, refunds have become more common
even as attitudes toward return preparation have deteriorated. In the
1950's, returns showing overpayments ranged (as a percentage of all
returns) from a low of 56% in 1951 to a high of 63.7% in 1959, with
60.3% as the average of the annual percentages for the decade.8 5 The
average of the annual percentages was 66.8% in the 1960's, 76.9% in
the 1970's, 74.9% in the 1980's, 73% in the 1990's, and 78.2% from
2000 to 2005.86 The average size of refunds has also increased over
the decades, even after adjustment for inflation. 7 Converted to 2005
dollars, the average overpayment (on returns showing overpayments)
was $784 in 1954, $954 in 1965, $1,670 in 1975, $1,787 in 1985, $1,794 in
1995, and $2,597 in 2005.88 All else being equal, the increasing preva-
lence and size of refunds might have been expected to make taxpayers
feel better about the return preparation process, but any such effect
84 See IRS, Selected Historical and Other Data, 26 Stat. Income Bull. 177, 254 tbl.9
(Spring 2007) ("Number of Individual Income Tax Returns, by Type of Tax Settlement, Tax
Years 1950-2005"), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/histab9.xls.
85 Author's calculations based on id.
86 Author's calculations based on id.
87 See IRS, Selected Historical and Other Data, 26 Stat. Income Bull. 177, 285 tbl.19
("Internal Revenue Tax Refunds: Amounts Refunded by Quarter and Fiscal Year, 1987-
2007"), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/histabl9.xls.
88 Author's calculations using the the inflation calculator of the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, http://www.bls.gov/cpi, and based on IRS, note 84, at 181 tbl.1 ("Individual Income
Tax Returns: Selected Income and Tax Items for Tax Years 1999-2005"), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soilhistabl.xls; IRS, Statistics of Income 1995: Individual Income Tax
Returns 81 tbl.3.3; IRS, Statistics of Income 1985: Individual Income Tax Returns 36
tbl.1.4; IRS, Statistics of Income 1975: Individual Income Tax Returns 97 tbl.3.10; IRS,
Statistics of Income 1965: Individual Income Tax Returns 14 tbl.4; IRS, Statistics of In-
come 1954: Individual Income Tax Returns 39 tbl.4.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 61:
HeinOnline -- 61 Tax L. Rev. 72 2007-2008
2007] CIVIC VIRTUES OF A TAX RETURN FILING REQUIREMENT 73
seems to have been more than offset by forces acting in the opposite
direction.
Having rejected the hypothesis that trends in overpayments can ex-
plain changing attitudes toward tax return preparation, one might
consider the possibility of causation running in the opposite direction.
Lee Anne Fennell has suggested that taxpayers may treat
overwithholding as an analgesic:
Significant refunds effectively bundle the costs of completing
tax paperwork with a larger reward (the refund), and hence
could significantly reduce the pain associated with the task.
People probably do not have this notion consciously in mind
when they overwithhold, but the positive reinforcement as-
sociated with having a large, attractive reward paired with an
unavoidable and distasteful task could play a role in perpetu-
ating overwithholding behaviors.8 9
If Fennell's suggestion is correct, then taxpayers may have responded
to the increasing pain caused by increasing tax preparation complexity
by taking more and larger doses of pain-relieving refunds. There is a
risk, however, in reading too much into changing withholding patterns
because the available evidence suggests that the extent of
overwithholding is largely within the control of the government. Tax-
payers tend to accept whatever amount of withholding happens to be
produced by the mechanical application of the withholding tables, de-
spite their ability to increase or decrease their withholding relative to
the amount produced by the default rules.90
C. Can the Civic Virtues Be Regained?
A return filing requirement can have significant civic virtues, but
only if the substantive law is simplified so that the return preparation
burden-in time and in dollars, with or without the help of software
or paid preparers-is seen by taxpayers as reasonable. The attitude of
Holmes (and Kramden) toward taxes lies dormant among the U.S.
89 Lee Anne Fennell, Hyperopia in Public Finance, in Behavioral Public Finance 141,
151 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006).
90 See Matthew D. Shapiro & Joel Slemrod, Consumer Response to the Timing of In-
come: Evidence from a Change in Tax Withholding, 85 Am. Econ. Rev. 274, 276 (1995)
(reporting results of a survey of taxpayer responses to a 1992 change in the withholding
tables that reduced the amount of withholding produced under the default rules; fewer
than 10% of taxpayers surveyed reported that they "adjusted their withholding to offset
the mandated change"); see also IRS, note 84, at 285 tbl.19 (showing a large drop in re-
funds from fiscal year 1992 ($88.6 billion) to fiscal year 1993 ($74.2 billion), almost cer-
tainly in response to the changes in the withholding tables). For the official announcement
of the 1992 withholding changes, see Notice 92-6, 1992-1 C.B. 495.
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public, waiting to be reawakened by a revised income tax with a less
aggravating return preparation process. In 1999, 2002, 2003, 2004, and
2006 the IRS Oversight Board commissioned national Taxpayer Atti-
tude Surveys, which asked respondents (among other things) whether
they agreed with the (ungrammatical) statement: "It is every Ameri-
can's civic duty to pay their fair share of taxes." In three of the five
years, 95% of respondents "completely" or "mostly" agreed with the
statement; 96% and 94% "completely" or "mostly" agreed in the
other two years.91 Perhaps even more remarkable, surveys conducted
since 1990 have consistently found a substantial portion of taxpay-
ers-nearly a quarter in several cases-who either "loved" or "liked"
"doing [their] income taxes. ' 92 It is difficult to know what to make of
these "loved" and "liked" responses. For one thing, the respondents
are a mix of users of paid preparers, software users, and paper-and-
pencil users, so "doing taxes" does not mean the same thing for all
respondents. In addition, it is not clear why some people love or like
doing their taxes-are they the spiritual heirs of Holmes and
Kramden, do they associate doing taxes with receiving refunds, or are
they just puzzle enthusiasts? 93 Despite this uncertainty, the survey re-
91 IRS Oversight Board, 2006 Taxpayer Attitude Survey, Question 2 (Feb. 2007), http://
www.treas.gov/irsob/reports/2006_taxpayer-attitude-survey.pdf. The 2006 survey changed
the question slightly, asking respondents whether they agreed with statement, "It's my civic
duty to pay my fair share of taxes." Ninety-four percent of respondents agreed with the
statement ("strongly" or "somewhat"). A 2006 survey commissioned by AARP asked re-
spondents to agree or disagree that "it is every American's civic duty to pay their fair share
of taxes." AARP, Opinions on Taxes Among U.S. Adults 5 (Mar. 2006), http://as-
sets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/taxsurvey.pdf. Almost all (92%) of the respondents agreed
("completely" or "mostly") with the statement. Id. Another private poll of U.S. taxpay-
ers, conducted in 2003, asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement: "I
don't mind paying taxes because my taxes are part of my contribution to society as a citizen
of the United States." Eighty-two percent agreed (including 56% agreeing strongly). Stan-
ley B. Greenberg & Anna Greenberg, Taxes, Government and the Obligations of Citizen-
ship 6 (Nov. 12, 2003), http://www.GreenbergResearch.com/articles/156211986_pip_
m1l1203.pdf. The difference between the Greenberg results and the IRS Oversight Board
and AARP results may be due to the difference in the wording of the statements; perhaps
10% to 15% of taxpayers recognize that paying taxes is their civic duty but nevertheless
mind fulfilling that duty.
92 AEI Studies in Public Opinion, note 74, at 71. The AEI Study summarizes the results
of four Gallup/CNN/USA Today surveys taken in 1990, 1991, 2000, and 2001. Each survey
asked respondents whether their attitude toward doing their taxes was one of "love",
"like", "dislike", or "hate." In 1990, 2% chose "love" and 21% chose "like." The corre-
sponding numbers in 1991 were 2% and 22%, 3% and 15% in 2000, and 3% and 21% in
2001. In a 2005 survey conducted by Harris Interactive for the Tax Foundation, however,
only 1% of respondents to an almost identical question selected "love", and only 11%
selected "like." Id. at 72.
93 A closer look at the results of the 2001 Gallup/CNN/USA Today survey results
reveals that the percentage of taxpayers who love or like doing their taxes decreases as
income increases. Frank Newport, Americans Suffer from Negative Mental Attitude While
Doing Taxes, Gallup News Serv., Apr. 12, 2001, http://institution.gallup.comcontent/
default.aspx?ci=1807. Newport suggests this is "most probably due to the fact that low-
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suits suggest that a nontrivial amount of goodwill toward the return
preparation process has survived the increasing complexity of the in-
come tax. Most remarkable of all, perhaps, is the result of a 2005
survey asking respondents to select one of six adjectives to describe
how "the process of paying your taxes" made them feel; more se-
lected positive or neutral adjectives ("happy" (4%), "satisfied" (15%),
and "neutral" (41%)) than selected negative ones ("frustrated"
(17%), "anxious" (10%), and "angry" (7%)).94
There are indications, then, that the civic virtues of a return filing
requirement might be reclaimed under a simplified income tax. But
what sort of simplification would be needed? In attempting to answer
that question, it is useful to distinguish two sorts of return preparation
complexity. First, there is the complexity faced by the taxpayer when
he sits down to prepare his return; the proliferation of phaseout provi-
sions and the growing impact of the alternative minimum tax (AMT)
have greatly increased this sort of complexity in recent years.95 Sec-
ond, there is the planning and recordkeeping complexity that taxpay-
ers face throughout the year in anticipation of the eventual
preparation of their returns. This second sort of complexity has also
significantly increased in recent years, due to the impressive growth of
narrowly targeted tax benefits for particular types of expenditures. 96
Phaseouts and the AMT have had an impact here as well, because it is
income families generally have the lowest taxes to pay." Id. Even in the highest income
group (households with annual income above $75,000), however, 2% loved and 14% liked
doing their taxes. Id.
94 AEI Studies in Public Opinion, note 74, at 72 (summarizing Blum & Wepring/NBC
News Poll, Apr. 2005).
95 For an insightful critique of phaseouts, based partly on their contribution to return
preparation complexity, see Robert J. Peroni, Reform in the Use of Phase-Outs and Floors
in the Individual Income Tax System, 91 Tax Notes 1415, 1429-33 (May 28, 2001). For a
complexity-based critique of the growing impact of the alternative minimum tax, see The
President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, note 17, at 85-87.
96 Most of the new benefits have taken the form of credits, rather than deductions.
Some sense of the growth of personal credits can be gleaned from the recent history of the
"Personal Credits" chapter in the treatise Federal Income Taxation of Individuals. The
1995 edition featured only five personal credits (the earned income tax credit, the foreign
tax credit, the dependent care credit, the credit for elderly and disabled taxpayers, and the
home mortgage credit). Boris I. Bittker & Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Federal Income Taxa-
tion of Individuals 27 (2d ed. 1995). The 2002 edition added six more credits (the child
tax credit, the adoption credit, the higher education credit (Hope scholarship and lifetime
learning), the District of Columbia first-time homebuyer credit, the qualified academy
bonds credit, and the credit for elective deferrals and individual retirement account contri-
butions). Boris I. Bittker, Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Federal In-
come Taxation of Individuals 27 (3d ed. 2002). The current supplement to the third
edition features five more credits (the clean renewable energy bonds credit, the health care
tax credit, the nonbusiness energy tax credit, the credit for residential energy-efficient
property, and the credit for alternative motor vehicles). Id. (2007 Cum. Supp. No. 2 T 27).
By this count, the number of personal credits has grown from five in 1995 to sixteen in
2007.
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often difficult for a taxpayer to determine whether he will actually
receive a benefit if he makes a putatively tax-favored expenditure, af-
ter the phaseouts and the AMT have done their work.
Both types of complexity can and should be reduced, but reduction
of the second sort of complexity is the more important goal. No doubt
complexity of the first sort drives some taxpayers to hire paid
preparers or buy return preparation software, generating resentment
of the out-of-pocket cost of dealing with complexity. 97 In addition,
this sort of complexity has greatly decreased the transparency of the
process of arriving at one's tax liability, making it impossible for most
taxpayers to verify that their tax liability was arrived at by the applica-
tion of a fair set of rules. On the other hand, once a taxpayer has
made the move to a paid preparer or software, the problem of the
taxpayer directly confronting return preparation complexity-armed
with only pencil, calculator, and scrap paper-simply disappears. 98
Return preparation computational complexity is not a headache-al-
though it imposes a cost in dollar and cents-for the seven out of eight
taxpayers who have delegated the task of dealing with that complexity
to a paid preparer or a computer program. A major reduction in com-
putational complexity might modestly reduce the percentage of tax-
payers hiring paid preparers and the average cost of return
preparation services, but it would not greatly reduce the incidence of
headaches (and resulting bad feelings about the income tax in particu-
lar and the federal government in general) brought on by taxpayer
encounters with Form 1040, for the simple reason that seven out of
eight taxpayers have already taken steps to avoid those headaches.
The major goal of simplification should not be to reduce the per-
centage of taxpayers hiring paid preparers, or to reduce the average
cost of return preparation services. Rather, it should be to reduce the
time burden of tax planning and recordkeeping during the tax year
itself (as contrasted with the time burden of dealing with Form 1040
after the tax year has ended). The substantial time burden that is not
avoided by taxpayers who hire paid preparers is overwhelmingly at-
tributable to such recordkeeping and planning. An IRS study of tax-
97 See Peroni, note 95, at 1431 (plausibly suggesting that the growth in the number of
phaseouts has "probably led to an increase in demand for tax preparation software ... and
tax preparation and advisory services by middle-income taxpayers as well as high-income
taxpayers").
98 So, for example, the criticism of the AMT by the President's Advisory Panel on Fed-
eral Tax Reform, based on the AMT's contribution to return preparation complexity ("mil-
lions of taxpayers ... have to undertake this painful and complex series of calculations
[and] complete the complicated worksheets just to determine whether they are entitled to a
tax benefit or whether it is taken away by the AMT") seems seriously overstated, given
that only one taxpayer in eight prepares his return without the assistance of a paid
preparer or software. See President's Advisory Panel, note 17, at 86.
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payers filing Form 6251 (the AMT form) for tax year 2000 estimates
that taxpayers who filed Form 6251 and used paid preparers had an
average time burden of 51.3 hours.99 Of that 51.3 hours, the two larg-
est components-together constituting almost 80% of the total-were
recordkeeping (32.9 hours) and tax planning (7.6 hours). 100 This sec-
ond aspect of complexity requires taxpayers to inform themselves dur-
ing the tax year of potentially available credits and deductions, to
determine whether they can satisfy the eligibility rules (including the
daunting task of determining whether they remain eligible for particu-
lar tax benefits after taking into account phaseouts and the AMT),
and keeping the necessary records. As the Service's time burden esti-
mates indicate, it is difficult or impossible to avoid these tasks by hir-
ing paid preparers. Alleviation of this second-and more important-
type of complexity could be achieved by the repeal of most of the
recently enacted narrowly targeted tax benefits, and the simplification
of those that remain (for example, by elimination of phaseouts or by
permitting the benefits under the AMT as well as the regular tax).
Drafting the necessary legislative changes would present no great
technical challenges, although generating the necessary political will
might be difficult indeed-especially since each new deduction or
credit quickly generates its own constituency, which will strongly op-
pose any attempt to repeal it.10
99 Allen H. Lerman & Peter S. Lee, Evaluating the Ability of the Individual Taxpayer
Burden Model to Measure Components of Taxpayer Burden: The Alternative Minimum
Tax as a Case Study, IRS Res. Bull., 158, fig. 9 (2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-soi/04lerman.pdf.
100 Id. In this regard, it is also interesting to note the results of a 2003 public opinion
survey that asked respondents to identify one of four options as the leading cause of tax
complexity. Most respondents-56%--chose "[t]here are so many different kinds of de-
ductions and tax credits, and so many rules about how to take them," 17% chose "[t]he
forms are too hard to fill out," 13% chose "[i]t requires too much record keeping," and
12% chose "[t]here are too many different tax rates, such as 15%, 25%, and 35%." Na-
tional Public Radio/Kaiser Family Foundation/Kennedy School of Government, National
Survey of Americans' Views on Taxes 11 (2003), available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/
3340-index.cfm. Hiring a paid preparer would not enable taxpayers to avoid much of the
complexity caused by the bewildering array of deductions and credits, nor would it enable
them to avoid any of the complexity due to recordkeeping requirements.
101 The responses to a question posed in a 1977 survey give some sense of the political
difficulty of achieving simplification. Respondents were asked to choose between the cur-
rent income tax system and a system featuring "a much simpler tax return form than the
current system, [which] the average taxpayer could fill out . . .by himself in about an
hour." The Roper Organization, H&R Block Study-The American Public and the Income
Tax System: A Study of Public Attitudes Toward Income Tax System Quest. 16 (1977),
available at http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/roperweb/catalog40/
catalog40.htx;start=summary-link?archno=USRSPHRBLOCK1977-0599. The question
suggested that the reform would be revenue neutral overall, but that any given taxpayer
might see his tax bill increase or decrease by as much as 10% as a result of the move to the
simpler system. Id. For most respondents risk aversion trumped the desire for simplifica-
tion; 54% expressed a preference for retaining the current system, while only 28% pre-
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Even if major simplification could be accomplished, there is a con-
cern that it may be too late to reawaken Holmesian attitudes toward
taxation. The worry is that events of recent decades-especially the
Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, and now perhaps the Iraq
War-may have irreparably damaged public trust in the federal gov-
ernment and in its ability to spend tax dollars responsibly. Were pub-
lic confidence in the tax side of taxing-and-spending reestablished, the
civic virtues of return preparation might remain lost because of public
distrust of the spending side. 102 Historic polling data from the Univer-
sity of Michigan's American National Election Studies (ANES) sug-
gests this problem may be real. Since 1958 ANES has periodically
asked respondents, "How much of the time do you think you can trust
the government in Washington to do what is right-just about always,
most of the time or only some of the time?" 10 3 In 1958 (during the
decade of Ralph Kramden), 73% answered "most of the time" or
"just about always. ' 10 4 By 1974, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War
and Watergate, that figure had fallen to just 36%.105 Since then the
percentage of respondents trusting the government most of the time
or always has varied considerably over time, ranging from a low of
21% in 1994 to a high of 56% in 2002 (not long after the attacks of
September 11, 2001).106 Although ANES has not yet published its re-
sults for 2006, a New York Times/CBS News poll asking the identical
ferred the simpler system (although an additional 8% volunteered they would prefer the
simpler system if they could be guaranteed their tax bill would not go up). Id.
102 There is a growing literature, in the tax compliance field, on factors that improve or
worsen "tax morale"-that is, the willingness of taxpayers to comply with their tax obliga-
tions even when cost-benefit analysis would seem to call for noncompliance. Empirical
studies indicate that tax morale is positively correlated with trust in government, and with
the perception that taxpayers receive benefits from public goods financed by their taxes.
See, e.g., Torgler, note 54, at 131-37 (trust in government); John T. Scholz & Mark Lubell,
Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic Approach to Collective Action, 42 Am. J. Pol.
Sci. 398, 412 (1998) (trust in government); James Alm, Betty R. Jackson & Michael McKee,
Estimating the Determinants of Taxpayer Compliance with Experimental Data, 45 Nat'l
Tax J. 107, 110-11 (1992) (public goods); James Aim, Gary H. McClelland & William D.
Schulze, Why Do People Pay Taxes?, 48 J. Pub. Econ. 21, 32-34 (1992) (public goods);
James Alm, Betty R. Jackson & Michael McKee, Fiscal Exchange, Collective Decision In-
stitutions, and Tax Compliance, 22 J. Econ. Behavior & Org. 285, 298 (1993) (public
goods). The tax morale studies are not directly on point here, since compliance is not the
focus of this Article. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that developments that weaken tax
morale in the compliance sense-particularly declining trust in government and percep-
tions of increasing waste of tax dollars-also would undermine the civic virtues of a return
filing requirement.
103 The American National Election Studies, The ANES Guide to Public Opinion and
Electoral Behavior (tbl.5A.1) (Univ. of Mich., Center for Pol. Stud., 2005), available at
www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab5al.htm.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
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question in January 2006 (with the Iraq War and the government's
response to Hurricane Katrina presumably on the minds of respon-
dents) found only 32% of respondents usually or always trusting the
government.107
ANES also periodically asks a question focused on the govern-
ment's stewardship of tax revenue: "Do you think that people in the
government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or
don't waste very much of it?"108 Only 43% of respondents answered
"a lot" in 1958, but by 1974 that answer was given by 74% of respon-
dents.'0 9 After reaching an all-time high of 78% in 1980, the "a lot"
response kept in a fairly narrow range over the next two decades (with
a high of 70% in 1994 and a low of 59% in both 1996 and 2000).11 ° In
2002 the 9/11 effect reduced the "a lot" response to 48%, but the fig-
ure bounced back to 61% in 2004.111
The polling data suggest that during the 1950's the government en-
joyed a level of public trust (both in general and with respect to its
stewardship of tax dollars) that it has not enjoyed since, and which it
may never enjoy again. On a more optimistic note, however, the data
also indicate that public distrust of government is not unchangeable.
Even setting aside the dramatic but short-lived increase in trust in
government following 9/11, there remain significant (albeit less dra-
matic) increases in trust during both the Reagan and Clinton pre-
sidencies. Particularly encouraging is the fact that the percentage of
respondents believing that the government wastes "a lot" of tax
money was 19 percentage points lower in 2000 than in 1980.112
Giving due consideration to the post-1950's decline in trust in gov-
ernment, it seems fair to conclude that while income tax simplification
is a necessary condition for the recovery of the civic virtues of tax
return preparation, it may not be sufficient. It is also necessary that
taxpayers have a modicum of trust in the federal government, and in
its ability to spend tax dollars carefully. Despair seems uncalled for,
however, since there is no convincing evidence that the required level
of trust is unattainable-in fact, the required level probably existed as
recently as 2002, although it may not exist at the moment.11 3 There
107 New York Times/CBS News Poll, Question 14 (Jan. 27, 2006) available at http:/www.
nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/20060127-poll-results.pdf.
108 The American National Election Studies, note 104, at tbl.5A.3.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. (78% in 1980, compared with 59% in 2000).
113 In a thoughtful and statistically sophisticated article examining possible explanations
for the decline in Americans' trust in government, John Alford suggests that the most
promising explanation relates to perceived levels of external threats to the country. John
R. Alford, We're All in this Together: The Decline of Trust in Government, 1958-1996, in
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remains, then, good reason to hope that a simpler income tax system
could lead to the recovery of the civic virtues of a tax return filing
requirement.
In light of that hope, the Panel's implicit rejection of return-free
systems makes sense, when paired with the Panel's simplification pro-
posals. If the income tax could be significantly simplified (obviously a
question of political will, not technical feasibility), I would cast my
vote in favor of the continued imposition of a return filing require-
ment. An exact withholding system would destroy the current deli-
cate compromise on the appropriate level of tax consciousness, and
would eliminate the sense of civic participation made possible by re-
turn filing. William Kambas takes an equally dim view, on citizenship
grounds, of tax agency reconciliation (in the form of the California
ReadyReturn program).114 He claims that it "tilts the scales from gui-
dance toward relief from responsibilities ...risks the reduction of
taxpayer awareness of the fiscal process and thereby risks the dilution
of responsible fiscal citizenship." 115 I disagree. Although it is often so
labeled, tax agency reconciliation is not really a return-free system. A
taxpayer using an agency reconciliation system would examine the
tentative return prepared by the Service, make as many corrections to
the return as the taxpayer deemed appropriate, sign the return, and
send it in. Withholding would continue to be inexact, so a taxpayer
would continue to compare her tax liability with her withholding, and
either request a refund or pay tax with the return. All this should be
more than sufficient to produce the tax consciousness desired by
Grover Norquist and his allies, and to retain the sense of tax filing as
an important aspect of civic participation.
The level of taxpayer participation in the return filing process under
tax agency reconciliation closely resembles the level of participation
of those taxpayers-more than six out of ten-who use paid preparers
What Is it About Government that Americans Dislike? 28, 45-46 (John R. Hibbing & Eliz-
abeth Theiss-Morse eds., 2001). When the perceived external threat level is high, trust
appears to be high; when the perceived threat level declines, trust tends to diminish. Id.
Although the article predates the attacks of 9/11, the increase in trust in government fol-
lowing the attacks supports Alford's suggestion. See note 106 and accompanying text. If
Alford is correct, and if the public perceives terrorism as a long-term external threat com-
parable to that of the Cold War, the prospects for relatively high levels of trust in govern-
ment over the next decade or two may be good. We must take our silver linings where we
can find them.
114 Kambas, note 30, at 1447-51.
115 Id. at 1450; see also Thorndike, note 27, at A19 ("In 1955, the commissioner of the
Internal Revenue Service, T. Coleman Andrews, went so far as to decree that the agency
should stop helping people fill out their tax forms. His reasoning? Americans should be
educated, not coddled.").
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 61:
HeinOnline -- 61 Tax L. Rev. 80 2007-2008
2007] CIVIC VIRTUES OF A TAX RETURN FILING REQUIREMENT 81
under the current system.116 If the level of participation in the filing
process required of taxpayers who use paid preparers is sufficient to
produce the civic benefits of a return filing mandate (as I believe it is),
then the level of participation required of taxpayers using a tax agency
reconciliation system should also be sufficient. It is true that tax
agency reconciliation demands less of a taxpayer than the use of a
paid preparer, in terms of information gathering and out-of-pocket ex-
penditures, but the core aspects of a filing requirement-reviewing
and signing the return, and reconciling one's withholding with one's
actual tax liability-all remain.
The civic virtues of the filing process actually may increase under
agency reconciliation, compared with either the use of a paid preparer
or preparing the return oneself, because most of the negative feelings
engendered by grappling with complexity (or paying a surrogate to do
so) would be eliminated. In this regard it is important to remember,
as Joseph Bankman has pointed out, that even a simple tax return can
be daunting to many taxpayers:
[Flor a substantial portion of the population, those forms
[1040A and 1040-EZ] are not at all simple. Slightly more
than 20 percent of the population lacks the skills necessary to
read a food label, fill out a form, or read a simple story to a
child. Even individuals with terrific reading skills find filing
an anxiety-laden experience.... Economists have attempted
to measure the time spent on filing and fees paid by taxpay-
ers but cannot measure the anxiety, frustration, and anger
associated with filing.117
In short, the introduction of tax agency reconciliation (for taxpayers
with simple income tax situations), accompanied by a general simplifi-
cation of the income tax, might restore the virtues of a return-based
income tax as an exercise in participatory democracy. Perhaps
America has become too pervasively cynical for one to hope that any
taxpayer will ever give a speech like Ralph Kramden's as he signs his
116 Toder, note 76, at 759 (reporting, based on IRS data, that 62% of individual returns
were prepared by paid preparers in 2003); see also They Prepare the Tax Laws, but Not
Their Own Returns, Wash. Post, Apr. 17, 2006, at All ("Three of the four top lawmakers
on the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committees ... pay professionals to
file their annual tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service.").
117 Bankman, note 12, at 1431; see also Goolsbee, note 27, at A25 (noting that the in-
structions for Form 1040-EZ are thirty-six pages); Austan Goolsbee, The Turbo Tax
Revolution? Evaluating the Ability of Technology to Solve the Tax Complexity Dilemma,
in The Crisis in Tax Administration 124, 136 (Henry Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004)
("The irony is that the people who find the EZ form simple are exactly the ones who
cannot use it .... Perhaps that is one reason why as many as half those filing the easiest
forms hire a paid tax preparer .... ").
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return, but it should be possible to do far better than the Roseanne-
like attitudes that dominate today.
As part of the program to recover the civic virtues of return filing,
April 15 might be declared a national holiday, "Taxpayers' Day." The
act of paying taxes is important enough to merit that recognition. Tax-
payers would be rewarded for fulfilling their financial responsibilities
of citizenship, and they could spend part of the day reflecting on the
civic importance of their status as taxpayers. Even if the national holi-
day is never introduced, more communities might follow the model of
Lawrence, Kansas, which since 1987 has had a tax return filing party
at its post office every April 15, complete with live music, dancing, and
food.18
Another step toward recovery of the civic virtues of return filing
might be the adoption of Eugene Steuerle's longstanding proposal to
enable taxpayers to "take deductions for charitable contributions until
they file their income tax returns or until April 15, whichever comes
first."'119 (This would mirror the timing rules under current law with
respect to deductions for contributions to individual retirement ac-
counts.120 ) Steuerle favors the proposal because he believes it will in-
crease charitable contributions, but the proposal is also attractive
from the perspective of fiscal citizenship. Saul Levmore has suggested
that the charitable deduction can be understood as a quasi-voting
mechanism, under which "dispersed donors . . . determine which
agents, projects, or causes the government will finance. '121 It is a
costly vote, of course, because the tax avoided by the deduction is
always less than the amount the taxpayer contributes to charity: "We
might ... think of taxpayers as agents employed to decide where gov-
ernment funds should go; these agents must pay for their choices, or
votes, in order to take their decisions more seriously. ' ' 122 Levmore
does not discuss Steuerle's proposal, but the proposal meshes neatly
with Levmore's analysis; The quasi-voting aspect of charitable deduc-
tions would be more perspicuous to the average taxpayer under
118 Eileen Kinsella, Lace Up Those Dancing Shoes, Grab Your 1040-It's Tax Time!,
Wall St. J., Apr. 15, 1997, at B1; Chris Moon, April 15 Tax Deadline is Cause for Celebra-
tion in Downtown Lawrence, Topeka Capital-Journal, Apr. 14, 2003.
Civic-minded corporations also might help with the April 15 festivities. On at least one
April 15, Starbucks celebrated tax day by offering a free cup of "Calm Tea" to every cus-
tomer. Joseph Michelli, The Starbucks Experience: 5 Principles for Turning Ordinary into
Extraordinary 86 (2006). It is questionable, however, whether sending the message that
taxpayers need calming down after their encounters with Form 1040 furthers the civic pur-
poses of the return filing process.
119 Gene Steuerle, Increasing Charitable Giving: The April 15 Solution, 48 Tax Notes
221, 221 (July 9, 1990).
120 IRC § 219(0(3).
121 Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 387, 388 (1998).
122 Id. at 416.
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Steuerle's proposal than under current law. Adoption of Steuerle's
proposal could serve, then, as a bridge between the discharge of the
political obligations of citizenship (through voting) and the discharge
of the financial obligations of citizenship (through taxpaying). An ad-
ditional civic advantage of Steuerle's proposal is that it should make
taxpayers feel better about the tax return preparation process, by giv-
ing them control at the time of return preparation over how much tax
they owe. Even at the last minute, a taxpayer would be able to avoid
some amount of tax by paying some larger amount to her favorite
charity. This increased sense of control might well lead to an in-
creased sense of fiscal citizenship. Of course, this citizenship-based
rationale for extending the deadline for making charitable contribu-
tions strongly suggests that the charitable deduction should be availa-
ble to nonitemizers and itemizers alike; denying this aspect of
citizenship to taxpayers claiming the standard deduction would be
counterproductive.
IV. Do THE Cwic BENEFITS OF TAXPAYER STATUS FLOW FROM
RETURN FILING ALONE, OR IS A NET INCOME TAx
LIABILITY ALSO NECESSARY?
In its discussion of using a VAT as a partial replacement for the
income tax-so that only higher-income people would be subject to
the income tax-the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Re-
form noted that "101.1 million taxpayers [sic] would have no income
tax liability" under that approach.123 Panelists disagreed on the policy
implications of that fact:
Some members of the Panel felt that it was inappropriate to
increase the number of taxpayers Who do not make a direct
contribution to the cost of maintaining the federal govern-
ment through income taxes. Others took the opposite posi-
tion, commenting that . . . lower and middle-income
taxpayers ... would continue to pay taxes, at the cash regis-
ter through the VAT and through payroll taxes.124
The disagreement is not about whether it is important that income
taxpayers file returns, but rather about whether it is important that a
large percentage of the population have a net (that is, after-credit)
income tax liability. 125 Nevertheless, the two issues are closely re-
123 President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, note 17, at 194.
124 Id.
125 Presumably the panelists who thought it was important to have a large number of
taxpayers "makfing] a direct contribution to the cost of maintaining the federal govern-
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lated, because the arguments in favor of subjecting a high percentage
of the population to the income tax closely resemble the arguments in
favor of a return filing requirement. In each case, the argument is that
it is important that people be viewed (by themselves and by others) as
having taxpayer status-both because of the sense of citizenship it
confers, and because taxpayer status may cause one to keep a more
watchful eye on government expenditures. 12 6
Opposing the growth in the number of federal income tax return
filers without federal income tax liability-fueled largely by the
earned income tax credit (EITC), the child tax credit, and the intro-
duction of the 10% bracket-has become something of a crusade for
the Tax Foundation. According to the Tax Foundation, "[In 2004,
some 42.5 million Americans (one-third of all filers) filed a tax return
but had no tax liability after taking advantage of their credits and de-
ductions. ' 127 The Tax Foundation views this as a recipe for disaster:
While some may applaud the fact that millions of low- and
middle-income families pay no income taxes, there is a threat
to the fabric of our democracy when so many Americans are
not only disconnected from the cost of government but are
net consumers of government benefits. The conditions are
ripe for social conflict if these voters begin to demand more
government benefits because they know others will bear the
costs.
1 2 8
ment through income taxes" would have considered that goal to be achievable by a broad-
based income tax administered through exact withholding (such as the U.K.'s PAYE). Id.
Despite the absence of tax returns, such a system-unlike a VAT or a national sales tax-
would continue to associate particular amounts of federal tax payments with particular
individuals. Of course, the payroll tax is an individually-based return-free federal tax,
which raises the question why those panelists did not consider the continued imposition of
the payroll tax as adequate to ensure broad-based "contribution[s] to the cost of maintain-
ing the federal government." Id. The probable explanation is that the payroll tax is
earmarked for particular narrow purposes-the financing of Social Security benefits and
Medicare-and thus does not constitute a contribution to the general costs of government.
See IRC §§ 3101(a) (imposing 6.2% payroll tax on employees, earmarked for the financing
of Social Security) and § 3101(b)(6) (imposing 1.45% payroll tax on employees, earmarked
for the financing of Medicare). If payroll tax collections were not earmarked, those panel-
ists might have viewed the payroll tax as satisfying their desire for widespread "direct con-
tribution[s]" to the cost of government, despite its return-free administration. See
President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, note 17, at 194.
126 This suggests a hierarchy of tax systems, in terms of their ability to confer taxpayer
status on individuals. A return-based income tax is superior, in this respect, to a return-
free income tax. Even a return-free income tax, however, is superior to a tax-such as a
VAT or a sales tax-that does not directly impose tax on individuals and does not calculate
the total amount of tax paid by each individual.
127 Scott A. Hodge, Putting a Face on America's Tax Returns 6 (2005). By comparison,
only 16% of tax filers paid no income tax in 1968, and only 18% in 1983. Id. at 6, chart 3.
128 Id. at 8-9.
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When asked a leading question by a Tax Foundation-sponsored sur-
vey, 59% of American adults surveyed agreed that "everyone should
be required to pay some minimum amount of tax to help fund
government. '129
As a matter of substance, insisting that nearly everyone be a net
income taxpayer seems almost silly. After all, as one group of panel-
ists pointed out, it is possible to be a net federal taxpayer despite hav-
ing no federal income tax liability. This is common enough now,
because of payroll taxes and excise taxes,130 and would be much more
common if a federal VAT were added to the mix. It is also possible, of
course, for a person to have a federal income tax liability, yet be a
recipient of a net transfer from the federal government because of
benefits received outside the income tax system. Many people receiv-
ing Social Security benefits undoubtedly fall into this category. An-
other group of people in this category would be created if the
substance of the EITC were retained, but the administration of the
program were removed from the income tax system.
The Tax Foundation (and the panelists who share its concern) nev-
ertheless may have a point as a matter of psychology. The civic bene-
fits of widespread taxpayer status-both in conferring a sense of
shared fiscal citizenship and in encouraging careful scrutiny of govern-
ment expenditures-may depend on the vast majority of the popula-
tion being income taxpayers, rather than merely income tax filers.
Those who file income tax returns but pay no tax (with or without
receiving refundable credits) may not be understood-by themselves
129 Tax Foundation, 2005 Annual Survey of U.S. Attitudes on Tax and Wealth 9 (2005).
The question read: "Last year 44 million Americans-that's one-third of all taxpayers-paid
no federal income tax after deductions and credits. Thinking about your own tax burden,
do you think this is fair, or do you feel everyone should be required to pay some minimum
amount of tax to help fund government?" Id. It is worth noting, however, that less leading
versions of the same basic question, asked in previous decades, indicated considerably less
enthusiasm for making the poor pay income tax. A 1986 survey asked, "As a matter of
public policy, do you think that everyone who receives an income should pay SOME
tax-even if it's only one dollar-or do you think that people below the poverty level should
not have to pay any tax?" The no-tax option was the choice of 59% of respondents; only
39% wanted to impose the tax on everyone. Roper/H&R Block Study #1986-0643, The
American Public and the American Income Tax System, Question 15 (Apr. 1986), availa-
ble at http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/roperweb/Catalog 4O/
Catalog40.htx;start=topSummary-Link?R=1&Archno=USRSPHRBLOCK1986-0643.
When the same question had been asked in 1979, the results were similar-56% opposed
tax on the poor, while 41% favored it. Roper H&R Block Study #1979-0673, The Ameri-
can Public and the Income Tax System, Question 22 (May 1979), available at http://
roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/roperweb/Catalog 40/Catalog4 .htx;
start=topSummaryLink?R=1&Archno=USRSPHRBLOCK1979-0673.
130 See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxation Without Representation, 55 Tax L. Rev. 555, 584-92
(2002) (demonstrating that many of those who do not pay federal income tax are net fed-
eral taxpayers after the burden of other federal taxes is taken into account).
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or others-as taxpayers, and this may be true even if their payroll and
excise tax payments exceed their refundable credits.13' I have sug-
gested elsewhere that administering the EITC as part of the income
tax has significant advantages over welfare-based administration, in
terms of administrative efficiency and encouraging program participa-
tion by eligible individuals. 132 The possible symbolic importance of
income taxpayer status, however, suggests an argument for taking the
EITC out of the income tax system. When 59% of the respondents to
the Tax Foundation's survey said they wanted everyone to pay some
income tax, it is doubtful that they meant that no one should receive a
net transfer from the federal government. They might be happy
enough with the substance of the EITC, if only it were removed from
the income tax. The divorce of the EITC from the income tax might
then produce a more universal sense of fiscal citizenship than is possi-
ble under current law.133 The disaggregated view described here-of
each tax as isolated from all other taxes, and of transfer payments as
isolated from all taxes-may be irrational, but it also may be deeply
ingrained. 34 If the irrationality is inevitable, it may be better to de-
131 Beyond the intangible benefits of taxpayer status on which this Article focuses, tax-
payer status can be important for standing purposes under both federal and state law. In
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), the Supreme Court ruled that federal income taxpayers
had standing to challenge federal expenditures under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. Many states permit taxpayer standing to enjoin the illegal expenditure of
government funds under certain conditions. This raises the question of which kinds of
taxes can give rise to taxpayer standing. State courts generally have been hostile to tax-
payer standing based on sales taxes. A number of cases conclude that consumers cannot
base standing on sales taxes because retailers, rather than consumers, are the technical
taxpayers. See, e.g., Cornelius v. Los Angeles County Metro. Transp. Auth., 57 Cal. Rptr.
2d 618, 628 (1996); Collins v. State, 750 A.2d 1257, 1261 (Me. 2000); Stumes v. Bloomberg,
551 N.W.2d 590, 593 (S.D. 1996). The Supreme Court of Texas held for prudential reasons
that payment of sales tax did not confer taxpayer standing, despite the fact that under
Texas law purchasers are liable to the state for sales tax. Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171,
180 (Tex. 2001). The court explained: "Extending taxpayer standing to those who pay only
sales tax would mean that even a person who makes incidental purchases while tempora-
rily in the state could maintain an action. This would eviscerate any limitation on taxpayer
suits." Id. Although the Supreme Court has not been asked to decide whether Flast stand-
ing extends to payers of federal taxes other than the income tax, the state court cases
suggest that Flast standing would be doubtful for those who pay no federal income tax, but
do pay federal excise taxes or a future federal VAT.
132 Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax
Credit, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 1867, 1915 (2005).
133 With respect to the fiscal watchdog benefits of taxpayer status, it is possible that a
person who does not notice when an income tax rate increase reduces the amount of his
EITC refund, might notice when the same rate change increases his income tax liability
while leaving his EITC untouched.
134 For evidence to that effect, see Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The
Humpty Dumpty Blues: Disaggregation Bias in the Evaluation of Tax Systems, 91 Organi-
zational Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 230 (2003).
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sign tax and transfer systems by taking that irrationality into account,
rather than by ignoring it or hoping it will go away.
In support of the idea of taking the EITC out of the income tax in
order to solidify the taxpayer status of EITC recipients, it is worth
noting that the public perception of Social Security recipients as in-
come taxpayers does not seem to be affected by the likelihood that
their Social Security benefits exceed their income tax liabilities. It is
unclear to what extent this phenomenon is attributable to a general
tendency to view the income tax in isolation from other federal pro-
grams (whether tax or transfer), and to what extent it is peculiar to the
perception of Social Security benefits as having been earned by prior
payments of payroll taxes. If the former explanation is the more im-
portant one, perceptions of EITC recipients as taxpayers might be en-
hanced by moving the substance of the EITC outside of the income
tax system.
Nancy Staudt has suggested that the social obligation of low-wage
workers may be understood as an obligation to earn a wage-to work
for a living-rather than an obligation to pay tax. 135 Under this view,
filing an income tax return in order to claim the EITC could serve as a
ceremony documenting a low-wage worker's satisfaction of his social
duty to work for a living, and taxpayer status-or its moral
equivalent-would be thereby conferred on the EITC claimant even
if he received a net transfer from the government. From this perspec-
tive, administratively divorcing the EITC from the income tax would
be exactly the wrong thing to do. As intriguing as Staudt's suggestion
certainly is, in light of the responses to the Tax Foundation's survey it
seems unlikely that the public currently understands simply participat-
ing in the labor force as a substitute for paying tax, or that the public
could be brought around to that way of thinking. If the public cannot
be converted to Staudt's perspective, separating the EITC from the
income tax may be necessary if recipients of EITC transfer payments
(in excess of precredit income tax liabilities) are to be perceived as
taxpayers.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the overwhelming complexity of the income tax return prep-
aration process today, it is difficult to imagine (or remember) that a
tax filing obligation might have civic virtues. A system of inexact
withholding and return-based reconciliation can serve as an attractive
compromise between small government proponents who would like to
make the taxpaying process as visible and painful as possible, and big
135 Staudt, note 130, at 985-86.
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government proponents who would like to make the process invisible
and painless. And if the tax system is not so complicated as to make
return preparation a miserable experience (in terms of the taxpayer's
own time and effort, money paid to a preparer, or both), the return
preparation and filing process can serve as civic ceremony of equal
dignity and importance to voting. All these benefits would be lost
under a national sales tax or value-added tax, or under an income tax
with exact withholding and no return filing. Although the President's
Panel did not explain its implicit rejection of a return-free system, in
the context of its simplification proposals it was right to retain a filing
requirement. On the other hand, the preparation of tentative tax re-
turns by a governmental agency (as in the case of California's
ReadyReturn) is not really a return-free system. Such a system, made
available to taxpayers in simple income tax circumstances, would be
consistent with-and might even enhance-the civic virtues of a tax
return filing requirement.
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